City 10KT IND Effects
Analysis of the damage rings
A 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) that is detonated on the surface of Doha City can affect a wide perimeter of the area. The smallest ring of damage by the atomic weapon is known as the fireball radius and is the most adjacent to the location where the explosive would burst. It would cover 200 m (0.12 Km2). In this circle, the height of the blowup of the IND determines the significance to lived effects. The radioactive effect is likely to be high in the region of the explosive touches the ground (Gwak etal.,2 015). As such, it would be appropriate to infer that the level of damage in this area would be extremely severe since the device is assumed to have touched the surface of Doha City. Air blast radius is the second smallest damage circle by a 10-Kiloton IND. It covers 470 m (0.69 Km2) and the pressure within this space is often 20psi. This pressure can cause serious damage and demolish concrete buildings that are heavily built. Besides, a 20 psi may lead to 100m percent fatalities. Most cities use air blast radius as a standard measure for heavy damage. It can be therefore be concluded that property, buildings, and infrastructure within this region in Doha is will be damaged beyond recognition. Above all, any life in the air blast can barely survive due to high pressure.
The third circle is also an air blast radius that covers a distance of 0.99 Km but with a smaller pressure of 5 psi. In this region, the damage caused by the IND is also significantly high but less severe than the first air blast ring. Fatalities are widespread and most of the structures are expected to collapse. Therefore, Doha City will face medium harm in this zone at the time of the explosion. On the other hand, radiation radius which is the fourth smallest circle affects people and buildings within 1.25 km and has a radiation dose of 500m. In this ring, the deaths caused by a 10-kiloton IND ranges from 50-90 percent of if there is no medical treatment. As such, medical emergency medical attention in this space can reduce the number of deaths. Fatality can occur in a few hours to several days. The second largest ring of a 10-kiloton IND is known as the thermal radiation radius which covers 1.41 km. Many people caught up within this range at the time of the device explosion suffer third-degree burns which are the most severe as they extend to all the three layers of the skin (Gwak et al., 2015). The casualties experience no pain since the burns often damage the pain nerves. Finally, the largest ring is an air blast radius of 2.53 km that is characterized by a pressure of 1 psi. Injuries resulting from damages such as windows glass breakage is widespread within this circle. Light damage but over a large area is likely to be experienced in this sphere.
Assessment of the effects of the weapon’s detonation in terms of likely casualty death and injury ranges and major public infrastructure damaged or destroyed
Death is often one of the adverse effects of detonation. In an explosion scene, emergency attention is needed to prevent and reduce the number of fatalities. Using the tool provided, the “NUKEMAP” the estimated fatalities on the city of Doha after a 10-kiloton IND blast is 11, 530 people. To start with people in the rings that are nearest to the center of the blast are less likely to survive. Whenever an explosion occurs, it causes tumbling or rather, throwing of the human body which causes often causes death (Gwak et al., 2015). As such, individuals within close proximity of blast area barely survive. In addition to being thrown, people who are near the near the nuclear device explosion are less likely to survive the incident as buildings and other blasted materials fall on them. Besides, thermal radiation, often in excess, has a capacity of causing fires is produced during an atomic explosion. One of the main categories of nuclear radiation generated during an explosion is the “prompt” radiation which is emitted immediately after detonation (Alai & Neuscamman, 2016). As a result, individuals in the direct zone of the blast are also likely to die as a result of being burned by heat energy and radiation. As such, almost all the people in the fireball radius and the first air blast rings have a higher possibility of dying after a 10-kiloton IND blast in Doha city. For instance, people residing, working or visiting areas such as Al Ahli sports club might not come out alive. The total the probable number of deaths in the first and second circles of destruction is 4, 000 people.
Moreover, individuals who will be found in the second air blast radius and the radiation radius rings during the explosion of the nuclear device are likely to die in large numbers. These spaces cover almost 3km which is significantly large than the area covered by the first two circles. Nevertheless, Doha is a sparsely populated city as it is still growing (Salama, & Wiedmann, 2016). Therefore, the number of people who die in areas encompassed in these circles, such as Najma Street, Ibn Shehab Street, and Nuaija zones are likely to die from extreme gamma-ray and neutron doses. The fatalities in the second air blast and radiation radius spheres are likely to amount to 5, 000 lives.
As for the injuries, “NUKEMAP” tool indicated that approximately 40, 020 people were likely to be injured if the 10-kiloton IND was detonated in Doha City in Qatar. Almost all of the injured people would be located in the two largest zones of the explosion, the thermal radiation, and the air blast radius. The rationale behind this is that these areas are the largest damage rings but the severity of the harm is smaller than in the areas next to the explosion area. During an explosion, thermal energy and radiation are minimal in places that are farthest from the point of detonation of a nuclear device (Alai & Neuscamman, 2016). As such people caught up in ranges such as Al Mansoura, Al Ameen, and Al Nouf, just to mention a few in Doha City are likely to experience third – degree burns and suffer injuries from incidences like window glass breakages.
Another effect of a blast caused by an IND is damage to structures, both public and private (Grant & Stewart, 2014). Being the capital City of Qatar and one of the upcoming tourist destinations in the world, Doha has experienced tremendous growth in the recent past (Shaaban & Radwan, 2014). The government of Qatar has constructed new infrastructure and expanded the already existing roads, railways, and airports. What is more, multiple investors, both local and international have established big businesses in the city. As such, blast would cause significant harm to the buildings and other infrastructure. To be specific, a 10-kilotons IND would severely demolish heavy built concrete public structures, such as hospitals, schools, banks, and stadiums which are adjacent to the place of explosion 9 Grant & Stewart, 2014). Some of the public structures that would be destroyed totally are the Al Ahli sports club and Hamad Bin Khalifa Stadium as they are within close proximity of the blast. Other major public infrastructures that would be damaged include the Grand Hamad Stadium, the old airport, the Spinney’s mall, El Emadi hospital, and regency hall.
What likely survived outside the major destruction rings that are available for an emergency manager?
To start with Doha is a city located at the coast. Its coast is one of the regions outside the destruction rings. In other word’s Doha’s coast is likely to have survived a 10-kiloton IND detonation. From the region of the explosion to the coast is approximately 3 km. As such an emergency response manager would utilize the coastal region as a place to evacuate the survivors for the first 762 hours. Doha coast is spacious, near, and a reliable resource that can be used to attend to the casualties. For instance, an emergency manager may ask volunteers and other people who have come to help the situation to set up tents where the victims can receive quick medical interventions. At the coast, there are no buildings that will collapse and therefore, it is assumed as a safe place for emergency practices.
Moreover, the coastal region of Doha City has multiple resources and infrastructure which might not have been damaged by the blast. For instance, Doha port has multiple ships which might be used to transport the casualties to safe areas. There are other multiple shelter locations that likely survived which are within close proximity, such as Qatar National Museum, Khadeeja Bint Khuwailid Independent Primary School, and Mesaimeer Service center, among others. Also, some of the most important structures that potentially survived that an emergency manager could find useful for transportation is the Doha International Airport and the Hamad International Airport. Doha International is about 1 km from the exploded zone. Health centers that could still be functioning after the blast in Doha city include the Qatar Medical Commission, HMC Hospital, Rumaillah Hospital, NCCCR Hospital, and Hamad Medical City. However, these medical care providers are far from the destruction rings. Majority of them are approximately between 2km to 3 km from the region affected by the nuclear detonation.
One of the first things I would ask to save the casualties on a large scale is emergency medical help. People who are already injured come first in every emergency situation as a measure to prevent and control fatality cases. As such, I would call upon first aiders and also volunteers who can help to dress the wounds of people who have been injured. I would also look for means of transport to take people who are seriously injured to the hospital. The government does not have to necessarily be relied upon for such help as it is often slow to respond, which can increase damages and also the deaths (Lundberg & Willis, 2015). As the injured persons are receiving medical aid, finding a way to put off the fire would be of great importance. This would prevent people who have not been harmed from sustaining any injuries and those who are already hurt by the wounds increasing. If the firemen do not arrive on time, I would ask the surrounding community, for instance, to use any water they can get to put off the fire. Most importantly, in an explosive incidence, it is also important to evacuate potential victims and move them to safe areas. This will help to stabilize the situation and enable the experts to assess the incidence without interference. Most importantly, seeking intervention from law enforcement officers to prevent the device from a further explosion would play a significant role in stabilizing the situation as well as for public protection (Lundberg, R., & Willis, H. (2015)). Site limits must be secured and overviewed after the explosion. Officers must react to any extra dangers or plundering/burglary issues.
Overall, Doha city would be greatly affected by a 10-kiloton IND explosion, both in terms of casualties and damage to the infrastructure. Typically, there are six rings of damage caused by the IND. The most severe damage occurs within the circles that are immediate to the place of explosion. The rate of death within the fireball and the air blast radius is almost 100 percent. People are likely to die as a result of extreme thermal heat, radiation, being thrown away, and buildings collapsing on them. On the other hand, buildings adjacent to the place of an explosion are likely to be destroyed beyond recognition. Burns and injuries are more prevalent in areas farthest from the point of detonation. Out of the 11, 530 people that were likely to die in Doha City as per the results from the tool provided, almost half of them would have been from the second air blast and radiation radius spheres which would be more than the individuals from the first spheres. The rationale behind these observations if that the inner circles are not densely populated and they are also small hence fewer people would have died. On the other hand, the second air blast and radiation radius spheres occupied a large distance and had a larger population and therefore, more people were likely to die. The tool also revealed that 40, 020 people in Doha City would die if the IND exploded. Injuries were more than the fatalities mainly because they would have outermost rings of destruction which are the biggest in terms of coverage. Among the public infrastructure that would be destroyed is the Al Ahli sports club and Hamad Bin Khalifa Stadium, the Grand Hamad Stadium, the old airport, the Spinney’s mall, El Emadi hospital, and regency hall, just to mention a few. However, multiple resources that an emergency manager could draw from were likely to be functioning after the blast. For instance, the Doha Coast and the Doha International airport would help in transporting the victims of the explosion and also offer shelter. To stabilize the situation, it would be necessary to seek emergency medical help, firefighting, services, and police intervention. IND can have serious damage if it exploded in a city as big as Doha. One of the most severe effects it would have is multiple deaths and destruction of structures worth billions. As such, cities should enhance their security to prevent such scenarios from happening.
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